{"id":265948,"date":"2023-03-04T07:07:23","date_gmt":"2023-03-04T12:07:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/?p=265948"},"modified":"2023-03-04T07:07:23","modified_gmt":"2023-03-04T12:07:23","slug":"in-search-of-lost-time-carter-and-cuba","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/cuba-usa\/in-search-of-lost-time-carter-and-cuba\/","title":{"rendered":"In search of lost time: Carter and Cuba"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cI traveled to Havana several times in late 1979 and early 1980. Without an immigration agreement since 1973, the Cuban government was concerned about the <\/span>hijackings of planes<\/b><\/a> and ships, and the assaults on embassies. Fidel has warned it, before the crisis broke out. I shared his concern. <\/span>Mariel<\/b><\/a> could have been avoided.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

This is how Peter Tarnoff, Special Assistant to the two Secretaries of State that the <\/span>Jimmy Carter administration<\/b><\/a> (1977-1981) had, told me. More than two decades had passed since then, but his interest in Cuban things was still alive, and I wondered what was going on here, as we made plans to teach U.S.-Cuban relations in a course we would both give.<\/span><\/p>\n

The years of rapprochement<\/b><\/p>\n

Just as Obama\u2019s turnaround on December 17, 2014 cannot be understood without the background and context in which it took place, neither can the Carter administration\u2019s rapprochement with Cuba be explained as a bolt of lightning in a clear sky. Doing so requires going beyond declassified documents, to examine the real theater of politics, where the intentions and wills of the characters, as in Greek tragedies, have to sail with opposite winds.<\/span><\/p>\n

Between 1970 and 1974, Chile, Peru, Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, Argentina, Panama and Venezuela were reestablishing diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba. In 1975 Colombia would do it; and the Organization of American States (OAS), without U.S. resistance, would leave each state free to normalize relations with the island. The total hemispheric isolation maintained for six years, with the sole exception of Mexico and Canada, crumbled.<\/span><\/p>\n

This attitude towards Cuba made it clear that if the United States proposed a renewed policy towards the region, a change in relations with the island was essential.<\/span><\/p>\n

The select committee that had toured the region in 1974, and that sponsored the Linowitz Report, would ratify it: Cuba and the sovereignty of the Panama Canal were the test-cases to measure a new U.S. policy, according to what the governments themselves said.<\/span><\/p>\n

Within the framework of the so-called \u201cnew dialogue\u201d for Latin America, promoted by Henry Kissinger, certain secret talks had begun with Cuba in 1974. President Ford would authorize U.S. subsidiaries in South America to trade with the island. In the diplomatic field, progress was made along a path that seemed to lead to rapprochement.<\/span><\/p>\n

Since 1971, initiatives to end the embargo and normalize relations had been presented in the United States Congress itself. Senators like Fulbright, Kennedy, Javitts, McGovern, and Pell, and representatives like Solarz and Whalen, had traveled as congressional ambassadors to Havana.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, and despite the signing of an agreement on plane hijacking in 1973, piracy and terrorism intensified. The swine fever virus would devastate the Cuban livestock population in 1971. A wave of attacks against embassies and fishing boats would be at their height in 1974. For its part, Congress had rejected, in 1975, the resolution to lift the blockade proposed by Representative Bingham.<\/span><\/p>\n

The virulence of the opposition to a change in policy towards Cuba was still alive.<\/span><\/p>\n

Vuelos robados. \u00bfOtra vez \u201carriba las manos\u201d? (I)<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n