{"id":268840,"date":"2023-04-28T19:10:30","date_gmt":"2023-04-28T23:10:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/?p=268840"},"modified":"2023-04-28T19:10:30","modified_gmt":"2023-04-28T23:10:30","slug":"elections-cuba-2023-something-new","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/opinion\/columns\/in-plain-words\/elections-cuba-2023-something-new\/","title":{"rendered":"Elections Cuba 2023: something new?"},"content":{"rendered":"

In these brief notes, I limit myself to arguing to what extent the last elections for deputies to the National Assembly of People\u2019s Power (ANPP) in Cuba show significant changes. I am not trying to defend a thesis or give an opinion on what I would like to happen, but to record those changes, in what distinguishes this process, that is, in its own terms.<\/span><\/p>\n

Given the brief space and the nature of this publication, I will point out here some data and considerations to contribute to an alternative vision within the impressions shared on social networks and reports, with different discourses, prevailing in the formation of public opinion.<\/span><\/p>\n

In general, these discourses do not explain the functioning of the political system, and above all, they ignore differences and nuances that can be found in the impartial examination of the available data on candidates and voting results. Although I have analyzed elsewhere the last three elections, in 2008, 2013 and 2018, the exhaustive comparison with these would be the subject of another text.<\/span><\/p>\n

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The size of the ANPP in 2023 was reduced from 605 to 470, that is, 22.3% less seats. This reduction was based on the regulation established in the 2019 Constitution, according to which, there would be a deputy for every 30,000 inhabitants, or a fraction greater than 15,000, in each municipality.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the process of conformation of the ANPP, the popular vote, since 1992, has played a role in two decisive moments. The first, by electing the base delegates, publicly nominated in open candidacies and voted in direct and secret suffrage, who constitute the pool for half of the ANPP.<\/span><\/p>\n

The second, by confirming or rejecting, through direct and secret suffrage, the selection previously made by mass organizations, municipal assemblies and electoral commissions at the municipal and national level.<\/span><\/p>\n

According to data provided by the National Electoral Council (CNE), some 19,000 pre-candidates formed the starting list, made up of 12,427 municipal delegates elected throughout the country, and the proposals of electoral organizations and commissions.<\/span><\/p>\n

This list was reduced to 4,000, which were the pool of nominees. Debated in 900 meetings between the mass organizations, the Municipal Assemblies of People\u2019s Power, and the commissions themselves, this list was reduced to the 470 seats of the new ANPP.<\/span><\/p>\n

So, the ratio between pre-candidates and each seat was 40. This filtering process, not the open candidacy, is the decisive one in the configuration of the new ANPP.<\/span><\/p>\n

To this configuration corresponded 221 grass-root delegates, originally nominated and voted openly, almost half (47.02%) of the recently constituted 10th Legislature. According to the CNE, the mass organizations and the commissions proposed and elected another 249. As I noted above, in a process that is characterized by nominating and at the same time electing a candidacy, which the popular vote merely confirms.<\/span><\/p>\n

Compared to previous elections, the proportion of grass-root delegates in this nomination was the same (47% in 2018). The main difference was in the meetings between those 470 nominees and their voters in each municipality. These had a different extension and intensity than other years.<\/span><\/p>\n

For seven weeks, between February 6 and March 24, all the nominees visited the municipalities they would represent in the ANPP. In the current context of crisis, these exchanges between voters and nominees did not have a ceremonial bias, but rather opened up another style and, possibly, a real and close commitment between municipalities and deputies.<\/span><\/p>\n

Votes: the macro<\/b><\/p>\n

As is known, in these elections more than 75% of the electoral registry voted.<\/span><\/p>\n

The province with the lowest electoral participation was, as expected, Havana (65%). It was followed by Holgu\u00edn (72.8%) and Guant\u00e1namo (73.8%). Those with the highest attendance at the polls were Ciego de \u00c1vila (86.1%) and Matanzas (83.88%). These two provinces were also the ones that voted the least blank ballots: Matanzas (4.57%), Ciego (4.98%); together with Camag\u00fcey (4.99%).<\/span><\/p>\n

The ones that deposited the most blank votes were Pinar del R\u00edo (8.22%), Holgu\u00edn (6.9%), Villa Clara (6.82%) and Sancti Sp\u00edritus (6.69%). All above the most abstentionists, Havana (6.66%) and Guant\u00e1namo (5%).<\/span><\/p>\n

The ones with the most annulled votes were Mayabeque (5.84%) and Havana (5.1%). The ones that voted the least were Guant\u00e1namo (1.98%), Santiago (2.44%), Granma (2.52%), Holgu\u00edn (2.75%), Ciego de \u00c1vila (2.82%) and Isla de la Juventud (1.66%).<\/span><\/p>\n

The blank vote can be taken due to disagreement or disapproval, discomfort with the economic situation; that is to say, as a protest vote, as it is usually called. It can also be a vote against those candidates. Or the system as such.<\/span><\/p>\n

As for the annulled vote, this is even more uncertain, and cannot be mechanically added to the blank votes. Anyone who has seen a vote count knows that writing a sentence on the ballot, no matter what it says, leads to an annulment. I have seen ballots annulled for saying that \u201cI vote No because this Constitution does not have an article that protects animals\u201d or \u201cI fully support this Family Code.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

Indeed, if one carefully observes the differences between the provinces, it will be found that abstention, blank vote and annulled vote are not in line in most cases, as would be logical if all expressed political opposition to the government or to the system.<\/span><\/p>\n

I wonder how the results are interpreted in any other country, where voting is not compulsory, just like here: are those who are not going to vote, do not vote for any of the candidates, or write on the ballots, are they counted as opposition to the system?\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Some observers have pointed out that \u201cthe deputies were elected by 71% of the valid votes cast (that is, by those that were not blank or null).\u201d But naturally, there were candidates who were elected with a vote lower than 71%.<\/span><\/p>\n

Regarding the question of the united vote, almost all the provinces, with the exception of Havana and Artemisa, reached more than 70% of the vote for all the nominees. However, the data on the provinces that followed this slogan the most and the least show a significant configuration.<\/span><\/p>\n

The territories that were above the national united vote of 72.10% were Isla de la Juventud (77.4%), Las Tunas (76.2%), Granma (75.4%) Guant\u00e1namo (74.0%), Santiago de Cuba (74.4%), Sancti Sp\u00edritus (73.37%), Villa Clara (73.85%) and Pinar del R\u00edo (73.33%).<\/span><\/p>\n

Those that least voted for the complete candidacy were Havana (68.45%), Artemisa (69.82%), Matanzas (70.11%), Ciego de \u00c1vila (70.28%), Camag\u00fcey (70.30%).<\/span><\/p>\n

When taking a careful look at these two groups and comparing them with the configurations of abstention\/blank vote\/null vote, it will be found that Havana is consistent, but others not so much.<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, the provinces with the best participation rates and valid votes, Matanzas, Ciego de \u00c1vila and Camag\u00fcey, cast fewer united votes, while they were among those with the fewest blank votes. That is, they voted more, better, but at the same time, more selectively.<\/span><\/p>\n

These results could lead to a reflection on the raison d\u2019\u00eatre of the united vote. Especially when the logic of the vote did not follow, in many cases, that \u201clesser-known candidates\u201d are at a disadvantage.<\/span><\/p>\n

This apparent inconsistency, which seems to reflect contradictory or chaotic behavior of the electorate, may have causes that require a deeper analysis of political behavior in the various regions, and which we do not usually do.<\/span><\/p>\n

The vote: the micro<\/b><\/p>\n

By closely examining the structure of the vote, it is possible to see who was the most and least popular.<\/span><\/p>\n

Of all the candidates, the ones that gathered the most votes at the national level, with 92% of the valid vote or more, were:<\/span><\/p>\n