{"id":332643,"date":"2025-12-26T15:27:53","date_gmt":"2025-12-26T20:27:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/?p=332643"},"modified":"2026-01-02T07:48:37","modified_gmt":"2026-01-02T12:48:37","slug":"practical-impacts-of-latest-partial-dollarization-measures-in-cuba","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/cuba\/practical-impacts-of-latest-partial-dollarization-measures-in-cuba\/","title":{"rendered":"Practical impacts of latest partial dollarization measures in Cuba"},"content":{"rendered":"

The publication of a regulatory package on dollarization has generated as much expectation as questions. First,\u00a0<\/span>the decree-law and the three resolutions that comprise it<\/span><\/b><\/a>\u00a0must be understood as the\u00a0\u201crules of the game\u201d\u00a0for foreign currency transactions in the Cuban economy.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Second, internal foreign currency transactions are not new, nor is the policy of partial dollarization. This process began in 2019 with the first stores selling goods in freely convertible currency (MLC) for\u00a0\u201cmedium and high-end\u201d\u00a0items. Since then, both state-owned and private\u00a0enterprises\u00a0have\u00a0operated\u00a0MLC accounts for foreign currency transactions. So,\u00a0what\u2019s\u00a0new now?<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The new measures expand the policy of partial dollarization.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In this sense, there are two\u00a0\u201cnew\u201d\u00a0elements:<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

1) the appearance of\u00a0real foreign\u00a0currency accounts, which\u00a0apparently replace\u00a0MLC accounts, although this is not\u00a0established\u00a0in the regulations nor have the authorities confirmed it, and<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

2) these accounts (real foreign\u00a0currency accounts) are adopted as the instrument for all foreign currency operations carried out by\u00a0enterprises\u00a0in Cuba.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This last point is important because state-owned and private\u00a0enterprises\u00a0have similar bank accounts for\u00a0operating\u00a0in Cuban pesos, but in foreign currency they have used accounts of a different nature until now.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While private\u00a0enterprises\u00a0operate\u00a0MLC accounts, state-owned\u00a0enterprises\u00a0have what are called liquidity capacity (LC) accounts.\u00a0LC\u00a0is not a currency, but a\u00a0\u201cright\u201d\u00a0to\u00a0purchase\u00a0foreign currency.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

For example, if the Ministry of Economy and Planning\u00a0(MEP)\u00a0allocated\u00a0$10,000 to the\u00a0LC\u00a0account, the\u00a0enterprise\u00a0could\u00a0acquire\u00a0them from the bank. But since these are not real accounts, if more\u00a0LC\u00a0is\u00a0allocated\u00a0than the foreign currency\u00a0actually circulating\u00a0in the economy, convertibility is lost.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The MLC, which is also not a currency, seems to have followed the same path, losing convertibility, which means that the dollars appearing in account balances are not equivalent to real dollars. Now all\u00a0enterprises\u00a0will\u00a0operate\u00a0the same type of bank account: in foreign currency.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

What is the guarantee that this problem will not happen again with foreign currency accounts? This must be answered by the Central Bank of Cuba (BCC).<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The preceding paragraphs reflect the complexity of the country\u2019s banking and financial system. Based on these elements, understanding the new measures and their impact requires analyzing their pillars: who can open and\u00a0operate\u00a0a foreign currency account, what their sources can be, what the retention coefficients are and what operations can be carried out.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Who can open a foreign currency account?<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/h3>\n

All economic actors\u00a0are authorized to\u00a0open foreign currency accounts. State-owned\u00a0enterprises, private\u00a0enterprises, cooperatives, self-employed workers, foreign investment businesses, among others, may request their opening from commercial banks.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One of the big questions about the new measures is what will happen to the MLC. Resolution 222\/2021 of the BCC, which regulated the operation of these accounts, has been repealed by last week\u2019s regulatory package. The truth is that the latest dollarization measures have been\u00a0eliminating\u00a0the usefulness of the MLC in the market: new state-owned stores that only accept\u00a0<\/span>Cl\u00e1sica\u00a0Card<\/span><\/a>\u00a0or cash,\u00a0purchases\u00a0of\u00a0<\/span>fuel in dollars<\/span><\/a>, and now the appearance of foreign currency accounts.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The sources of real accounts<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/h3>\n

Once opened, how are\u00a0the real\u00a0foreign currency accounts funded? The sources of foreign currency can be external or internal.\u00a0<\/span>External<\/span><\/b>\u00a0sources\u00a0represent\u00a0income from abroad for: exports, collections from e-commerce, as well as transfers, financing or donations received.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In contrast,\u00a0<\/span>internal<\/span><\/b>\u00a0sources\u00a0mainly include\u00a0sales within the national territory\u00a0to:\u00a0the Mariel Special Development Zone\u00a0(ZEDM), entities authorized to trade wholesale and retail in foreign currency (for example, Tiendas Caribe), or a foreign investment business (for example, a joint venture). Other internal sources acknowledge: the purchase of foreign currency on the exchange market (yet to be implemented) and the allocations made centrally by the Ministry of Economy, which are mostly destined for state-owned entities.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

And what is ACAD?<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/h3>\n

The Foreign Currency Access Capacity Allocation (ACAD) is another source of foreign currency, but it is not new. It can be considered a remnant of the\u00a0aforementioned Liquidity\u00a0Capacity (LC) accounts. It is a centralized allocation mechanism used by the Ministry of Economy to decide where to\u00a0allocate\u00a0money,\u00a0generally from\u00a0state entities that do not generate foreign currency. For example, since\u00a0the Cuban Oil Union (CUPET)\u00a0does not generate enough dollars to import all the fuel the economy demands, the\u00a0MEP\u00a0can\u00a0allocate\u00a0$70 million to buy a shipment of oil.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore, although ACAD can apply to\u00a0\u201cany other\u00a0individual\u00a0or legal\u00a0entity\u00a0that is authorized,\u201d\u00a0as\u00a0established\u00a0in the respective resolution, its use is primarily intended for the state sector. It is not realistic to view ACAD as a source of foreign currency for the private sector.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The problem with this mechanism is that it distributes foreign currency generated by others. Therefore, it is crucial to\u00a0maintain\u00a0a correspondence between the foreign currency\u00a0allocated\u00a0via ACAD and the\u00a0real foreign\u00a0currency that backs it. Otherwise, the same situation of loss of convertibility of MLC,\u00a0Cuban peso (CUC)\u00a0and\u00a0LC\u00a0would occur.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

How much do I\u00a0retain\u00a0and how much do I contribute?<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/h3>\n

However, not all foreign currency income is\u00a0retained\u00a0100% in the accounts. A\u00a0portion\u00a0goes to the central state account. This proportion is called\u00a0<\/span>retention\u00a0coefficient<\/span><\/b>. For example, a coefficient of 80% means that for every\u00a0$100 that enters\u00a0an\u00a0enterprise\u2019s\u00a0account, the\u00a0enterprise\u00a0keeps\u00a0$80 and gives\u00a0$20 to the State.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In practice, the coefficient is a state\u00a0<\/span>tax<\/span><\/b>\u00a0on foreign currency income. Although\u00a0to some extent it\u00a0is a disincentive for the\u00a0enterprise\u00a0that generates the dollars, it is an intermediate solution for the central state account to obtain foreign currency in the context of the chronic scarcity in the Cuban economy.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This is logical, considering that the central account is the one that finances the general needs of the economy and society, such as the purchase of fuel for\u00a0power\u00a0generation, the import of medicines or the financing of social projects that require foreign currency. <\/span><\/p>\n

Retention and contribution coefficients are not new mechanisms in the Cuban economy. They\u00a0essentially function\u00a0for state-owned enterprises and are designed for each sector: the biotechnology industry has its own, the export of medical services another, the nickel industry another, and so on. Their\u00a0objective\u00a0is to decentralize export revenues among the\u00a0involved actors\u00a0to guarantee their replenishment. This frees them from having to request foreign currency allocations from the MEP, an administrative mechanism that hinders the agility of the value chain.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Business\u00a0strategies<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/h3>\n

Although all economic actors can open\u00a0a real foreign\u00a0currency account and fund it with various sources, the\u00a0payments\u00a0and\u00a0collections\u00a0they can make are another matter. Operations that do not qualify under the new regulations are prohibited. For example, no micro, small or medium-sized enterprise (MSME) will be able to sell directly to the public in dollars, nor will any state-owned enterprise without the corresponding authorization.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Therefore, the business sector\u2019s strategies for generating foreign currency can be structured for two scenarios:<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Generating foreign currency independently<\/span><\/b>. This can be done through exports, which is not a simple activity. The merchandise must be competitive in price and quality to sell on the international market. On the other hand, Cuban regulations offer minimal incentives for exporting.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
      \n
    1. Partnering with entities that generate foreign currency<\/span><\/b>. The\u00a0enterprise\u00a0can obtain foreign currency according to the\u00a0retention\u00a0coefficients by selling to a joint venture, a business in the Mariel Special Development Zone, or a state-owned store that sells in dollars. This\u00a0isn\u2019t\u00a0simple either, given that the demand in this sector is\u00a0relatively small, so only the most competitive businesses will succeed.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      Nothing new here: observant people will have noticed that for years, stores selling in MLC have been selling domestically produced goods such as ice cream, canned\u00a0goods\u00a0and vinegar, manufactured by\u00a0MSMEs and other private businesses, as\u00a0evidenced\u00a0by the product labels. The sale of these products generates income in MLC for the\u00a0MSMEs,\u00a0demonstrating\u00a0that this second strategy has been in use for years.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      Pros and\u00a0cons<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/h3>\n

      The new measures on foreign exchange transactions deepen the dollarization of the Cuban economy, but they are not new at all. They\u00a0maintain\u00a0dollarization in business-to-business transactions. Positive points include:<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. It\u00a0maintains\u00a0a decentralized system for the use of foreign currency<\/span><\/b>. The State does not manage,\u00a0control\u00a0or\u00a0allocate\u00a0dollars through administrative and bureaucratic methods that hinder productive processes. Instead, a system is\u00a0maintained\u00a0where the entity that generates foreign currency can\u00a0retain,\u00a0invest\u00a0and multiply it.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
      2. It benefits exporters<\/span><\/b>. Related to the\u00a0previous\u00a0point, the entire chain of production, industrialization and trade of exportable goods and services benefits from the possibility of using,\u00a0recovering\u00a0and generating foreign currency. The benefit extends to all\u00a0enterprises\u00a0with export potential, including the private sector.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
      3. It puts state-owned and private\u00a0enterprises\u00a0on equal footing in the use of real accounts<\/span><\/b>. In operational terms, the classification and functioning of bank accounts for foreign currency operations are standardized,\u00a0establishing\u00a0the same type of account for all economic actors. This can contribute to greater operational agility in partnerships between private and state-owned\u00a0enterprises.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
      4. It serves as a bridge to other measures<\/span><\/b>. It is one of the measures that\u00a0anticipate\u00a0the implementation of the future official foreign exchange market, a key mechanism for buying and selling foreign currency.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        However, the problems with these measures revolve around their approach, potential\u00a0risks\u00a0and the essential need for complementarity with other policies:<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \n
        1. Excessive segmentation<\/span><\/b>. There is too much division between sources,\u00a0actors\u00a0and economic sectors, creating internal dollarized circuits in the Cuban economy that may become disconnected from those that\u00a0operate\u00a0only in pesos and do not have access to foreign currency. Furthermore, so many specifications can lead to misinterpretations of the regulations.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
        2. It may\u00a0anticipate\u00a0risks in the supply chain of private trade<\/span><\/b>. In Cuba, private businesses import all goods through state-owned import\u00a0enterprises. Until now, due to distortions in the financial system, the authorities had allowed private businesses to pay their foreign suppliers from accounts in third countries. If one of the\u00a0objectives\u00a0of the new measures is to \u201cregulate\u201d this, the authorities could require private businesses to pay state-owned import\u00a0enterprises\u00a0from their foreign currency accounts in Cuba. These state\u00a0enterprises\u00a0would then pay the supplier to carry out\u00a0the commercial\u00a0transactions and import the containers of goods. This, while logical, would disrupt the way the supply chain has functioned until now, through which chicken,\u00a0edible\u00a0oil, milk,\u00a0toiletries\u00a0and all kinds of goods for retail trade enter the country. This is not a minor issue. If, on the other hand, none of this happens, the international operations of private businesses will continue outside the Cuban financial system, as they have until now.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
        3. Increased\u00a0demand for foreign currency and a rise in the exchange rate<\/span><\/b>. The expansion of dollarization will increase the demand for foreign currency from businesses and households. An upward pressure on the informal exchange rate is foreseeable\u00a0as long as\u00a0this market continues to set the price of the dollar in the Cuban economy. This leads to another issue: the predictable establishment of an official exchange market, repeatedly announced in recent weeks.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
        4. Possible discretionary power<\/span><\/b>. Although initially no\u00a0private business\u00a0can sell in dollars to the population,\u00a0MEP\u00a0Resolution 140 introduces an exception for \u201cauthorized cases.\u201d This is a policy error that is based, once again, on discretionary power. Under what criteria would a small group of\u00a0micro,\u00a0small\u00a0and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) be allowed to sell in foreign currency?<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
        5. Economic and social inequalities<\/span><\/b>. Deepening dollarization\u00a0exacerbates\u00a0the gap between those who have much and those who have little. Just as the business sector is segmented, society is segmented between those who have access to dollars and those who only have access to pesos. Consequently, it is a measure\u00a0with\u00a0social (and political) costs that must be managed with other strategies.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          This set of regulations, in itself, will\u00a0not generate an\u00a0additional\u00a0dollar tomorrow, nor will it increase the production of\u00a0enterprises. In\u00a0an oversimplification, we can confidently state that these laws\u00a0<\/span>merely regulate the use of the existing foreign currency<\/span><\/b>, without necessarily stimulating its increase.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          Dollarization must be considered within the broader framework of the country\u2019s economic policy\u00a0objectives. It can function as a springboard to revive the precipitous decline in a\u00a0portion\u00a0of production, but the country needs a productive transformation policy with pillars based on diversification, boosting sectors with higher added value and fostering innovation and knowledge. And this requires an investment pattern that does not prioritize hotel infrastructure at the most critical moment for Cuban tourism, for example. This issue is not addressed in the\u00a0<\/span>Government Program for correcting distortions and revitalizing the economy<\/span><\/b><\/a>, which\u00a0<\/span>I recently analyzed<\/span><\/a>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          Dollarization has been accepted as an\u00a0\u201cinevitable\u201d\u00a0step in the government\u2019s plan to overcome the crisis, but it cannot be the\u00a0final step. It must be acknowledged that predicting timelines is difficult in this matter. But the dollarization policy itself must define when and how to de-dollarize,\u00a0in order to\u00a0restore the Cuban peso to all its functions.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

          \u201cReal\u201d dollar accounts? The publication of a regulatory package on dollarization has generated as much expectation as questions. What happens with accounts in freely convertible currency? Who benefits? What changes \u2014 and what doesn\u2019t \u2014 with the new measures? <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3134,"featured_media":332648,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13902,13903],"tags":[14816,29036],"ppma_author":[33546],"class_list":["post-332643","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-cuba","category-economy","tag-cuban-economy","tag-dollarization-of-cuban-economy"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nPractical impacts of latest partial dollarization measures in Cuba | OnCubaNews English<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"\u201cReal\u201d dollar accounts? 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