{"id":333901,"date":"2026-01-19T14:17:13","date_gmt":"2026-01-19T19:17:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/?p=333901"},"modified":"2026-02-11T11:55:13","modified_gmt":"2026-02-11T16:55:13","slug":"cuba-vs-united-states-lessons-and-anti-lessons-from-the-intervention-in-venezuela","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/oncubanews.com\/en\/cuba\/cuba-vs-united-states-lessons-and-anti-lessons-from-the-intervention-in-venezuela\/","title":{"rendered":"Cuba vs. United States: lessons and anti-lessons from the intervention in Venezuela"},"content":{"rendered":"

Examining in an unbiased way the geopolitical situation created by the U.S.\u00a0intervention in Venezuela and its implications for Cuba requires starting by taking a step back.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

First,\u00a0let\u2019s\u00a0remember the saying that\u00a0\u201cthere is no foreign policy like domestic policy.\u201d<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The distortion of what was happening here was the first challenge the Cuban leadership had to face. It was this distortion that led to the first visits of high-ranking leaders to the United States, Latin America, Africa and Asia, where a global foreign policy began to be forged, along with a plural and autonomous network of alliances with the emerging South and with various actors in the North. The implementation of the reform program, starting with agrarian reform, and the recovery of national sovereignty, social justice and development were the fundamental ingredients of the consensus and mobilization to advance that revolutionary domestic\/foreign policy. It was these ingredients that allowed for the rapid creation of a national defense and security system in the face of a counterrevolution supported by the U.S., which produced a civil war throughout the country and an invasion. It was the perpetuation of this conflict by the U.S.\u00a0and the continuation of its undeclared war that prevented the internal defeat of that counterrevolution in 1961-1963 from leading to reconciliation\u00a0later on. And it was\u00a0its\u00a0geopolitical interests that prevailed, above Cuba, the Cuban\u00a0people\u00a0and their national interests, to continue fueling that exiled counterrevolution and repurposing it in\u00a0its\u00a0domestic political game.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Naturally, on this side, that state of war caused the U.S.\u00a0factor to remain present in the domestic political landscape. Therefore, the degree of\u00a0tension in our bilateral relations has acted as a conduit to the internal situation,\u00a0almost always\u00a0for the worse, as is natural.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Before discussing the extent to which our domestic\/foreign policy can respond to the current challenges of the Venezuelan crisis and U.S.\u00a0interventionism, I want to revisit some points that contradict the\u00a0\u201cnarratives\u201d\u00a0related to the place of Cuba and Cubans in this complex geopolitical context.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This is not the first time that Cuban military and security advisors have collaborated with established governments in Latin America and the Caribbean. They did so with Salvador Allende in Chile (1970-73), with the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Nicaragua (1979-1990), and with Maurice Bishop in Grenada (1979-83). Of course, their specific weight was much lower than the civilian collaboration with those and other governments, as has also been the case in Venezuela.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Their role in security or advisory capacities in those countries and governments did not involve troops intended to\u00a0participate\u00a0in military operations. That role in the fields of health,\u00a0education\u00a0and sports, however, did involve thousands of doctors and health personnel, teachers, and sports and art instructors.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On the other hand, both in the case of the civilian workers in Grenada and the small group of military personnel who were carrying out personal security tasks in Venezuela, they found themselves caught up in a U.S.\u00a0intervention that far exceeded their mission,\u00a0numbers\u00a0and available resources. The lesson of the 24 who fell in Grenada, as well as the 32 in Venezuela, is that they could have refrained from confronting a force so many times superior; and that their resistance was not only their commitment, or their fidelity to the cause, nor does it have anything to do with ideological fanaticism or a suicidal vocation; but rather it is part of a patriotic political culture, active wherever they were entrenched. There, too, they were defending the homeland.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Photograph
Photograph from October 27, 2022. Photo: EFE\/Ernesto Mastrascusa.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In case anyone considers this a mere slogan, I emphasize that this is a relevant piece of military intelligence for a scenario of aggression against Cuba. That was the harsh lesson learned by the CIA officers who planned the Bay of Pigs invasion, as well as by the JFK administration, who had been assured by the newly arrived Cuban exiles that the Cuban militia and army would not fight.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Of course, we are not in the years of the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the internationalist missions in Angola, or the economic alliance and military supply with the USSR, but in the post-Cold War world, where we are left\u00a0\u201calone with imperialism,\u201d\u00a0as\u00a0<\/span>Kiva\u00a0Maidanik<\/span><\/b><\/a>\u00a0put it.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

When that geopolitical shift occurred, there was no dialogue with Cuba; instead, the U.S. passed the Torricelli Act, aimed at\u00a0\u201ctightening the U.S. embargo against Cuba and promoting democratic change on the island.\u201d\u00a0So\u00a0the cars in Little Havana filled with bumper stickers\u00a0proclaiming\u00a0\u201cNext Christmas in Havana,\u201d\u00a0and a bestseller titled\u00a0<\/span>Castro\u2019s Final Hour<\/span><\/i>\u00a0(\u201cthis time for sure\u201d) appeared as the guide to that collapse. Although no one would have taken notice at the time, among its readers was a young man studying political science at the University of Florida, named Marco Rubio. Almost 35 years have passed since then.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

One of the lessons learned from Operation Absolute Resolve is that despite its meticulous planning and the use of disproportionate force (for the\u00a0objective\u00a0of kidnapping a head of state), a handful of Cuban soldiers were able to put up a fight for two hours. The official story about the operation\u2019s impeccable efficiency would have been unsustainable if even one of the infiltrations into the Venezuelan defense system had failed, or if the Cubans had received reinforcements.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another lesson, or rather an anti-lesson, is that drawing conclusions from the Venezuelan case for Cuba is risky, to say the least. Especially if one overlooks the significant differences between the two, in terms of history, economic,\u00a0social\u00a0and cultural systems, and political systems. And armed forces.\u00a0Assuming that\u00a0the U.S.\u00a0doesn\u2019t\u00a0know this underestimates their level of information about real Cuba.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

According to the CIA (Cuba Military 2024, CIA World Factbook),\u00a0\u201cthe Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) are a central pillar of the Cuban regime and viewed as the guardian of the Cuban revolution; the FAR is largely focused on protecting territorial integrity and the state, and perceives the U.S. as its primary threat; the Army, once over 200,000 strong, but now estimated to have about 40,000 troops, is a conscript-based force armed with Soviet-era weapons.\u201d<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The CIA knows this and much more. According to Globalmilitary.net (Cuba Military Forces & Defense Capabilities),\u00a0\u201cthe Cuban Army has approximately 50,000 active personnel and a robust reserve and paramilitary force exceeding one million, which facilitates rapid mobilization for the defense of national territory.\u201d<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In strategic terms, according to the same source, it\u00a0maintains\u00a0\u201ca defensive doctrine that emphasizes territorial protection through a\u00a0\u2018people\u2019s war\u2019\u00a0strategy based on mass mobilization\u2026and a military posture oriented towards deterrence within geopolitical limitations.\u201d\u00a0\u201cThese efforts position Cuba to maintain a credible defense within fiscal and technological constraints.\u201d<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cCuba\u2019s military modernization is characterized by a focused effort to upgrade Soviet-era equipment, especially air defense systems, through collaboration with Belarus and Russia. Although limited in scope due to economic and geopolitical factors, these initiatives enhance Cuba\u2019s defensive capabilities.\u201d<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In short, according to platforms dedicated to military and security issues at the global level, Cuba\u00a0maintains\u00a0effective defense levels\u00a0appropriate to\u00a0its needs, limited to deterrence and defensive resilience purposes. The observation that this occurs\u00a0\u201cwithin geopolitical constraints\u201d\u00a0is not superfluous. None of these platforms\u00a0\u2014\u00a0MilitarySphere.com, Globalmilitary.net, Armyrecognition.com,\u00a0Globalfirepower\u00a0\u2014\u00a0register anything resembling foreign military bases on the island. Despite speculation surrounding Chinese or Russian facilities, which some\u00a0\u201cserious media outlets\u201d\u00a0have echoed, neither Trump nor Rubio have resorted to this argument in their references to Cuba.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another fundamental difference with respect to Venezuela in security matters is the cooperation\u00a0relationship with the U.S., particularly in priority areas such as migration control and drug trafficking interception in the Caribbean and surrounding waters.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This cooperation has included\u00a0various topics, on which progress was made not only with Democratic administrations but also with the Republican administration between 2017 and 2020. Between 2015 and 2024, eight bilateral working groups were established to jointly address terrorism, illicit trafficking of migrants and immigration fraud, money laundering and other financial crimes, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, trade\u00a0safety\u00a0and protection of individuals, human trafficking, cybersecurity and cybercrime (\u201cAntecedentes\u00a0y\u00a0valoraciones\u00a0necesarias\u00a0sobre\u00a0la\u00a0cooperaci\u00f3n\u00a0bilateral\u00a0oficial\u00a0entre Cuba y\u00a0los\u00a0Estados\u00a0Unidos,\u00a0en\u00a0materia\u00a0de\u00a0Aplicaci\u00f3n\u00a0y\u00a0Cumplimiento\u00a0de la Ley\u201d\u00a0[Background and Necessary Assessments of Official Bilateral Cooperation between Cuba and the United States on Law Enforcement], December 17, 2025, paper presented at the Center for International Policy Research).<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Caracas.
Caracas. Photo: Kaloian.\u00a0<\/span><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Building a case against Cuba\u2019s\u00a0leadership and Cuba, like the one the U.S.\u00a0put together to prepare for aggression against Venezuela, contradicts all of this. Some readers will tell me that Trump\u00a0is capable of concocting\u00a0\u201ca narrative\u201d\u00a0that ignores those interests and that cooperation, as he has done by paralyzing it throughout 2025.\u00a0\u00a0Certainly. But neither he, nor Rubio himself, have found any sense in extending the logic of military force against Venezuela to Cuba. Despite the sensationalist interpretations that his references to Cuba have aroused in some media outlets, the argument\u00a0\u201cCuba will fall on its own\u201d\u00a0has prevailed; because what is left for the U.S.\u00a0is to\u00a0\u201cdestroy the place,\u201d\u00a0an option that would not achieve what is supposedly the objective:\u00a0\u201cto bring democracy and freedom to the Cuban people.\u201d\u00a0But merely to\u00a0\u201cpunish the regime,\u201d\u00a0with few practical results\u00a0in\u00a0its political purposes. Because one thing is\u00a0\u201cthe narrative,\u201d\u00a0and another is the actual implementation.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Here we arrive at another fundamental difference between Venezuela and Cuba that many overlook, and which we could define as the political economy of intervention.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

What\u00a0was\u00a0the real\u00a0objective\u00a0of Operation Absolute Resolve?<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The current phase of the intervention has made it even more\u00a0evident\u00a0that its goal was to secure that nearby oil and that its constituency is the oil corporations. To run Venezuela is the most stark and current manifestation of imperialism, as described by its scholars and theorists at the beginning of the 20th century.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

According to that characterization, the U.S.\u00a0does not need to occupy Venezuela, nor even\u00a0establish\u00a0military enclaves in its territory, or appropriate the oil fields and other even more strategic minerals. As Admiral Alfred T. Mahan would say in his classic texts on geopolitics, what the U.S.\u00a0needs is to administer those territories as its new possessions. And if the current rulers were to\u00a0submit\u00a0to this new order, it would have achieved its\u00a0objective\u00a0at minimal cost.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Probably a\u00a0corporate man like Trump, proud of his abilities to resolve conflicts by applying his peculiar version of realpolitik, would be willing to\u00a0\u201cbalance the books\u201d\u00a0with a Cuban leadership that was willing to yield to his interests.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

If we were to momentarily consider the hypothesis of extending the policies devised for Venezuela to Cuba, we would find some interesting results, and ones that are very contradictory to certain accepted notions about\u00a0its\u00a0intended purpose. Although we know that this is a very improbable scenario, it is worth examining, because of what it\u00a0reveals about\u00a0the consistency and nature of these policies.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Havana.
Havana. Photo: EFE\/Ernesto Mastrascusa.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The first thing that stands out in Rubio\u2019s plan for Venezuela\u00a0\u2014\u00a0stabilization-recovery-transition\u00a0\u2014\u00a0is that the issue of\u00a0\u201cdemocracy and freedom\u201d\u00a0is relegated to the background. In effect, this formula prioritizes ensuring public order and the functioning of existing institutions, in contrast to the turbulence that an attempt at abrupt\u00a0\u201cdemocratizing\u201d\u00a0political change would generate.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Once this stability is secured, economic recovery\u00a0would\u00a0follow. As is known, given the structural nature of many problems, and their internal\/external interconnectedness, this recovery in Cuba could not be resolved in a few months, and in some\u00a0aspects, according to most experts, it would require years. The most obvious point is that the need for external capital would be essential in several sectors. But investing in an economy whose deficits begin with infrastructure (energy, water,\u00a0roads\u00a0and railways, etc.), a sector that would not guarantee short-term\u00a0profits,\u00a0cannot be solved with a magic wand. This is enough to realize that the issue of recovery is more complex than it seems.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Then would come\u00a0\u201cthe transition,\u201d\u00a0which would be the transformation of the political model. Although it is possible to imagine it, it is not clear right now how and to what extent the current model would be transformed. And even less clear is who the protagonists of that change would be.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

If this Rubio plan were to\u00a0actually guide\u00a0policy towards Cuba, it should instead propose\u00a0facilitating\u00a0a policy of reforms like the one the current Cuban government is\u00a0obligated\u00a0to implement to\u00a0channel\u00a0the recovery.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Instead of besieging and threatening it, it should replicate the policy that George H. Bush had towards China in 1978, when he re-established relations; and the one promoted by Republican Senator John McCain and Democrat John Kerry to re-establish relations with Vietnam (1995). These reforms did not respond to external threats or\u00a0dictates, but\u00a0rather stemmed\u00a0from changes within the communist parties themselves.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Learning from these lessons, they might also realize that the Chinese and Vietnamese diasporas did not play a leading role in generating the reforms, although they did benefit\u00a0greatly from\u00a0the Reform and Opening Up and the Doi Moi policies. This was not only in the opportunities opened up for their return and active participation in the economy, but also in education, culture, science and, in general, in their reintegration into their societies of origin, instead of continuing to oppose them and supporting the recalcitrant and isolationist policies of their historical exiles.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Thanks to the maintenance of these relations, and the continued dialogue between the U.S.\u00a0and these two governments at the highest level, their companies, universities, cultural institutions, and many government agencies, such as those for environmental protection, combating organized crime, drug trafficking, etc., were able to coordinate and advance in pursuit of their interests.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

For these reforms to succeed, a strong state was needed, capable of rebuilding a modern public sector that would drive and control development, guarantee welfare and basic social services, and drastically reduce poverty. Without such a strong state, it is impossible to guarantee stability or achieve the crucial goal of recovery, on the path to a comprehensive modernization of the entire system.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The opportunities to influence these internal\/external changes therefore lie more in dialogue than in ultimatums, in cooperation than in threats. These can only provoke reactions in defense of national sovereignty and independence, of which Cubans are extremely protective; increase the legacy of distrust accumulated\u00a0toward\u00a0the U.S.;\u00a0and ultimately, harm\u00a0the climate of freedom and debate necessary to advance the changes. This has been the typical effect of the besieged fortress mentality, which should not be a mystery to the U.S.\u00a0or to anyone familiar with Cuba.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Photo:
Photo: EFE\/Ernesto Mastrascusa.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

To conclude, we return to the\u00a0initial\u00a0topic of these notes. What\u00a0would be\u00a0the meaning of domestic policy in this geopolitical situation?\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Looking back, during Obama\u2019s short summer, the most complicated aspect was not the impact of his speech on civil society, the effect of his\u00a0\u201cgood guy\u201d\u00a0demeanor on Cubans accustomed to classic imperial arrogance, or the slowness of our ideological apparatus to adapt to the new context. The most delicate issue was the link between progress in bilateral relations and the dynamics of the ongoing reforms.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Many problems that make up the pending agenda of Cuban reforms\u00a0are located in\u00a0areas that overlap with the U.S. agenda toward Cuba. These include, for example, the expansion of the private sector and the facilities granted for its development; the expression of public opinion and the real autonomy of the media; access to and efficiency of the internet; the place of emigrants and their citizenship status; pending legislation on associations, the right to public protests, meetings, religious worship; etc. This U.S. agenda politically burdens these issues in a negative way.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

For this reason, a coherent internal policy, neither reactive nor opportunistic, would require advancing internal and external changes that strengthen its autonomy and decouple it from the dynamics of bilateral relations. That is, to prevent the meaning and raison d\u2019\u00eatre of these changes from being tainted in the eyes of public opinion, and on the contrary, to reinforce the necessary consensus to implement them, a consensus diminished by years of crisis and ineffective policies. The communication strategy\u00a0regarding\u00a0the nature of these internal changes, their scope and political implications would also be key to contributing to\u00a0an appropriate understanding\u00a0of our foreign policy, including our policy toward the United States.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Photo:
Photo: EFE\/Ernesto Mastrascusa.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

What should be done,\u00a0taking into account\u00a0the circumstances created by the intervention in Venezuela and the perspective of 2026? What should be the priority policies, consistent with a strategy to overcome the crisis and that address the complexity of the moment? How to move forward, facing\u00a0the challenges, and strengthening consensus, without being dragged down by\u00a0the besieged\u00a0fortress syndrome?\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

I sent these questions to a group of researchers specializing in the Cuban economy and politics, of different ages and backgrounds, who live here and are active in some of our institutions. I conclude these notes with a summary of their responses, which I asked them to keep brief.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Reform and restructuring of the general business sector, primarily state-owned enterprises.Resizing them, expanding their autonomy, and introducing market mechanisms into their operations to overcome bureaucratic inertia.<\/span><\/li>\n
  2. A policy of financial and banking reform and transparency (including a new tax policy); and a proactive monetary policy that guarantees a single (economically sound) floating exchange rate for the entire economy.<\/span><\/li>\n
  3. Consolidate, expand,deepen\u00a0and revitalize trade relations with Russia and China. Activate economic and political diplomacy with other countries to secure fuel supply lines (Mexico, Russia, Iran, Algeria, Angola).<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
  4. Stimulate exports through allpossible means. Achieve new agreements in other regions (Africa and eventually Asia), especiallyto export\u00a0medical services.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
  5. Generate initiatives to resolve external debt defaults, including asset sales, bond issuance, etc.,in order toopen up\u00a0international credit and encourage greater foreign investment. A more decisive opening to foreign capital and more facilities to\u00a0finalize\u00a0business deals; including Cubans\u00a0residing\u00a0abroad, for whom an expedited process (fast track) should be created.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
  6. Promote food production, including sugarcane.<\/span><\/li>\n
  7. Replace the centralized economic planning of material and financial resource allocation inherited from the USSR. Establish the market as the regulator of the state and non-state economy. Maintain centralized state planning todeterminethe strategic development of the economy and to prevent market distortions that affect the population, especially the most vulnerable.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
  8. Convert most state-owned enterprises into public companies with shares that can beacquiredby workers and other national and foreign individuals and legal entities. The management of these companies should be decided by their own workers, who\u00a0are responsible for\u00a0nominating and electing the\u00a0main business\u00a0leaders.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n
  9. Apply the different modalities of direct democracy, where citizens make binding decisions on public affairs. In the 2028 general elections, the Candidacy Commissions should nominate two candidates for each parliamentary seat, and the same procedure should be followed in the next elections of theCommunist Party of Cubaand mass and social organizations.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    As some of them warn me, none of this is purely technical or economic, separate from the political processes that must unfold and be negotiated in parallel; and building consensus from the bottom up is key to understanding the risks that must be taken and what must be conceded or sacrificed.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    I would only add that, while reforms must be designed and implemented by the State, ours involve the renewal of a social contract, which can only be achieved through open dialogue with society. Avoiding this confrontation, for considerations or conveniences of any kind, would be meaningless as a socialist policy.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    First, let\u2019s remember the saying that \u201cthere is no foreign policy like domestic policy.\u201d <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3343,"featured_media":333904,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[13902,13944],"tags":[14891],"ppma_author":[34051],"class_list":["post-333901","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-cuba","category-cuba-usa","tag-cuba-usa-relations"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nCuba vs. United States: lessons and anti-lessons from the intervention in Venezuela | OnCubaNews English<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Cuba vs. United States: First, let\u2019s remember the saying that \u201cthere is no foreign policy like domestic policy.\u201d\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link 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