Relations between Cuba and the United States are plagued by paradoxes. There are many of us in Cuba who dedicate ourselves to analyzing their progress, whether for work or study reasons or simply because we are conscious citizens, who know the influence they have on our lives. Many times, things happen that escape public scrutiny or that are difficult to unravel because the signals can be very ambiguous.
I have been analyzing them since I can remember. Initially as a restless young man dissatisfied with the state of affairs prevailing before 1959. I wanted to see Cuba free and independent but with minimally normal relations with its northern neighbor. Over time, it became part of my job, when I was a Cuban diplomat and, later, a university professor and researcher. It has been said, and I have no reason to deny it, that my most obvious professional specialty is being a specialist in Cuban-U.S. relations. In fact, I have written three books about it, the most recent, Diplomacia imperial y Revolución (Imperial Diplomacy and Revolution), was published in digital format in December of last year.
During these more than 60 years I remember many cases in which reality hid deeper truths. Probably one of the most contradictory stages was the one that took place between 2008 and 2014 before Raúl Castro and Barack Obama adopted the historic D17 agreements. I wrote a short text about that in 2009 that I titled “Cuba en Obama, Obama en Cuba.”
Perhaps because I never thought I would live to see it, I experienced with emotion the announcement of December 17, 2014, the date on which Raúl Castro and Barack Obama announced the promising agreement that began the short period of normalization, under which the diplomatic relations were reestablished. Likewise, I was stimulated by the subsequent rapprochement process, including Barack Obama’s visit to Havana. I also watched with apprehension the increasing deterioration of the process during the Donald Trump years. In 2016, while closely observing the presidential election campaign, I was convinced, as I wrote for OnCuba in October of that year, that “a Donald Trump administration would be extremely detrimental to the United States, to the world, and to Cuba and the Cubans.” Unfortunately, I was not wrong.
I confess that I was very disappointed that Joe Biden did not fulfill his campaign promises and maintained Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy. As I told Agence France Press in July 2021, the president “has evidently disappointed many [in Cuba] who expected, not that he would return to [Barack] Obama’s policies, but that he would reverse the harshest and crudest measures of [his Republican predecessor Donald] Trump.” I have not changed that assessment, even though since that date the administration has made some minor changes to the policy it inherited from his Republican predecessor. Trump’s essential decisions have been maintained under Joe Biden, including putting Cuba back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
It is not pointless to emphasize that in its actions in recent years, the Cuban government has done nothing to justify what happened since 2017, which included a cruel intensification of unilateral coercive measures, even in the midst of the COVID pandemic.
This introduction, more or less long, is necessary because, as will be seen, I will analyze the implications of four signs and one event that occurred in the last fifteen days in relations between both countries.
The signs are:
- On September 13, the interview in Washington of the deputy foreign minister and director general for the United States, Ambassador Carlos Fernández de Cossío, with the two highest U.S. officials for Latin America, Ambassador Brian Nicholls, assistant secretary of state, and Juan González, director for Latin America at the National Security Council.
- The categorical condemnation of the terrorist attack on the Cuban Embassy in Washington by President Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, on September 25.
- The holding in Miami of a meeting between Cuban private entrepreneurs and a group of Cuban-American counterparts with the presence of Biden government officials, on September 26 and 27;
- The discreet announcement that the team of diplomatic officials at the United States Embassy in Havana has been completed after 6 years in which it acted with reduced staff due to an arbitrary decision by the Trump administration, which reduced staff and suspended the operation of the Consular Section, hiding behind some obscure, still unknown health incidents that occurred in 2016-2017.
Finally, the event I am referring to is the prosecution of Cuban-American Democratic Senator Bob Menéndez for serious crimes of political corruption on September 22 and his resignation as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the following day.
These five events can have a positive impact or be a symptom of a more pragmatic approach on both sides in a panorama that remains pessimistic.
Deputy Foreign Minister Fernández de Cossío’s interview with Nicholls and González
These types of interviews are part of the normal work between foreign ministries when there are normal diplomatic relations between two states. However, they are rare when they occur between Cuba and the United States. Both parties acknowledged that they had discussed “human rights, immigration and other issues of bilateral interest.” But it was also commented that no progress had been made on the fundamental problems. For Cuba, the highest priority, but not the only one, is that it be eliminated from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
By saying that “other issues of bilateral interest” had been discussed, the door was left open for speculation about what they might have been. But one thing is clear. It was an important gesture by the Cuban government to send its deputy minister to talk in Washington with the U.S. side on the eve of the annual confrontation with the United States over the blockade at the UN General Assembly. And it was a gesture on the U.S. part to have received him at the highest possible level, which included the main White House official who deals with Latin American affairs, Juan González.
It must be considered a positive sign, even if it was apparently unsuccessful, according to what the Cuban foreign minister said to Reuters.
Condemnation of terrorist attack on Cuban Embassy in Washington
It is unusual for the U.S. president’s national security advisor to issue a statement condemning an armed attack against a diplomatic mission in Washington. That is reserved for friendly countries. Normally that issue should be handled by the State Department. In this case it was decided to issue a personal statement signed by Jake Sullivan in which it is said that he “strongly condemns” it and that he considers these attacks “unacceptable.” He added that they were in contact with Cuban embassy officials and law enforcement authorities to ensure a timely and appropriate investigation, as well as to offer support for future protection efforts. This statement contrasts with the complicit silence of the Trump administration on the previous occasion when the Cuban diplomatic headquarters was attacked on April 30, 2020 and with its passivity in investigating the incident and punishing the guilty.
It is, therefore, a positive step.
Meeting of entrepreneurs in Miami
The meeting of entrepreneurs in Miami has been reported extensively. As far as could be known, an important objective was achieved: establishing bases for relationships of mutual trust between Cuban entrepreneurs who live and act in Cuba and Cuban-American businesspeople interested in expanding business relations with the island.
Although everything around the event was handled very discreetly, the participants and some of us who knew in advance that it would be held had expectations that it would be a favorable space for the Biden administration to make announcements about benefits for the private sector in Cuba. That didn’t happen.
For more than a year, the U.S. government has been announcing in various ways that it will adopt a set of measures that would make sanctions more flexible to allow Cuban entrepreneurs to develop their businesses. One of those possible positive steps, revealed to the press by anonymous sources linked to the government, would be the possibility of opening accounts in U.S. banks. We will have to continue waiting.
On the other hand, in these same days it was informally learned that the Cuban government is evaluating whether Cubans residing abroad can invest and open businesses on the island. This was said in a meeting in New York by Díaz-Canel with outstanding businesspeople from the Cuban-American community in Miami, but there has been no firm statement on the issue.
The Cuban government has insisted that there is political will to do so but has not yet fully clarified the rules of the game.
The meeting between entrepreneurs from both shores was a first meeting but I suppose it will not be the last and it would be necessary for both governments to clarify the measures that will allow this relationship to be normal and fluid.
It is important that the four parties interested in developing this process (the two governments and the two communities) understand that none of the four can be marginalized.
Reestablishment of personnel of U.S. Embassy in Cuba
In the week of September 24 to 30, the U.S. Embassy in Havana organized several receptions to introduce the new personnel joining its diplomatic work, starting with its second chief (the DCM in U.S. diplomatic jargon), Elías Bauman, as reported by Rui Ferreira for OnCuba on September 22.
The Embassy will have heads in all Sections (Politics and Economy, Public Relations and Culture, Administration, etc.). One of the positions that attracted the most attention is the appointment of a Consul General, which suggests that at some point in the future, the non-immigrant visitor visa service will be reestablished for those people who do not wish to emigrate but rather visit their relatives in the United States.
Recalling the activities carried out by the Embassy during the normalization period from 2015 to 2017 under President Barack Obama, representatives of several significant segments of Cuban society were invited to the receptions: university professors, writers, artists, musicians, dancers, and cultural promoters. Apparently, there was no interest in inviting exclusively representatives of a certain political orientation, whether anti-establishment or not.
That’s a positive sign.
Situation of Senator Bob Menéndez
Senator Menéndez is well known for his positions against normalization and in favor of the intensification of unilateral coercive measures. I have referred to this in a recent article. He has had to resign as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from where he had managed to exercise a kind of veto over President Joe Biden’s Cuba policy.
This momentarily neutralizes an important obstacle to any initiative that the administration wants to take, if there is political will to do so.
It is not known what will happen to the Senator. Menéndez was already acquitted of a previous similar case, but this one is much more serious and will be tried in New York and not in New Jersey. Furthermore, in this case there have been many demands that he resign his seat, which he has refused to do in the strongest terms. So it may happen that he is acquitted again.
Of course, if he is convicted he will have to resign. But in any case, an opponent has already emerged, the representative to the House for the third district of New Jersey, Andy Kim, of Korean origin. Kim announced on Twitter that he will still run for the Democratic nomination. He already received the support of Ben Rhodes, who was President Obama’s Deputy National Security Advisor and architect of the agreement with Cuba.
If he is nominated and elected, it should be noted that he is a member of the Democratic Progressive Caucus in the House and that he worked for Barack Obama and Ben Rhodes, as director for Iraq of the National Security Council in 2015-2016. If this scenario occurs, the forces in favor of the coercive policy against Cuba will lose one of their most influential members and those in favor of returning to normalization a progressive senator, although new.
Of course, all this will depend on the result of the 2024 elections and whether Joe Biden, if re-elected, decides to seek better relations with Cuba in his second term, of which there is really no sign. If that happened, Menéndez would no longer be there to exercise his veto.
It may be that one makes the mistake of reading more than what is really in these signs or indications, but the ones noted may indicate a new period of relative thaw in which the desire of both parties to have a civilized dialogue would prevail.
However, there are very important obstacles on the U.S. side.
The first and most important is that it seems that the false idea of regime change or the collapse of the Cuban government as an essential central objective continues to prevail in the Biden administration.
The maintenance of Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism points in that direction and is a major obstacle.
Traditionally there has been another obstacle of no less significance and it is in the aggressive or disqualifying rhetoric with which U.S. officials refer to the Cuban government. A de-escalation process is required.
A U.S. colleague has compared Cuba-United States relations to a “roller coaster.” It may be that after having been in free fall for 6 years, with very few signs of stopping, we have entered a process of deceleration prior to a comeback along the path of normalization. But it will be necessary to see if we do not return to the metaphor of Sisyphus and his famous rock.
