A few hours after taking office, President Donald Trump laid the cornerstone to continue the sanctions policy against Cuba that he pursued during his first term. By reinstating the island on the list of state sponsors of terrorism — Biden had removed it six days earlier — he clearly established the direction he wants to take in his relationship with Cuba.
Being considered a “state sponsor of terrorism” has consequences that considerably worsen the island’s economic situation. But things don’t end there.
After the first two months of his term, everything indicates that this administration will continue to intensify its comprehensive approach to sanctions against Cuba.
He will do so by combining decisions that make life difficult for Cubans on the island with domestic policy decisions that could also affect the Cuban community in the United States, including those who fervently desire to tighten the screws on the Havana government.
Republican voters of Cuban origin in South Florida cast their ballots equally hopeful that Trump would lower inflation and prices at home, as well as ensure the final collapse of the Cuban government. But they didn’t expect the storm they helped create to blow the roof off their houses.
The Trump administration’s motivations for addressing the Cuba issue are not aimed at pleasing his voters. They may even disappoint and challenge them.
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The sudden cuts in public spending, the discontinuation of programs and agencies such as USAID — whose funds benefited groups, parties, and media outlets opposed to the Cuban government — and the paralysis of Radio and TV Martí in recent days have made it clear that Cuban issues will not be addressed in Washington in a traditional manner.
A ban on entry to the United States for all Cuban citizens is about to be implemented, with no humanitarian or political exceptions, as sources familiar with the matter told the Miami Herald days ago. The administration would shut the doors to all Cubans and definitively end the immigration agreements between the two countries.
The Miami Herald considered that “such an extreme version would be difficult for Republican politicians to defend.”
Cubans are increasingly being treated like any other minority — even worse, if the infamous travel ban is confirmed — and they fear, among other things, the consequences of this administration’s drastic approach to immigration.
“Get ready to leave”
Trump didn’t lie. During his campaign, the then-candidate announced the end of the Humanitarian Parole Program, launched in early 2023 by Biden and benefiting citizens of Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Haiti. And yet, he still obtained the votes of those communities. Those who were eligible to vote did so not in favor of the newcomers, but rather in support of the Republican leader’s goal of “cleaning” house.
Under the guise of Humanitarian Parole, some 110,000 Cubans and many others from the rest of the nationalities included in the program were granted entry to the United States. In an interview with Fox News in September 2024, Trump warned everyone: “Get ready to leave.”
He also said he would revoke the use of the CBP One phone app, used by migrants to request appointments to enter the United States. Trump himself is now urging everyone to self-deport using the same app, under the promise that they will later be able to enter the country legally.
Those who were granted “parole” through Form I-220A, issued to those detained after illegally crossing the border, would also be deportable.
In recent days, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has intensified its detention of Cubans with Form I-220A in Florida. At least three Cubans who showed up for routine supervision appointments were detained, and their final fate is still unknown.
All of these Cuban groups, whose immigration status is uncertain and numbering around half a million people, feel some degree of concern about the possibility of mass deportations becoming a reality, about which, incidentally, so far there has been no dialogue with Havana.
Most of those potentially affected remain silent, but a growing number of citizens and small organizations are raising their voices on social media and in some public spaces to demand that only those with criminal records be deported.
Who represents them?
Paradoxically, the more power the community has achieved through its representatives in Washington, the more insecurities loom over it.
Neither Secretary of State Marco Rubio nor the three congresspeople also of Cuban origin, María Elvira Salazar, Mario Díaz-Balart, and Carlos Giménez, have shown firm opposition to this treatment of people who have fled Cuba and been welcomed in recent years by their families settled in the United States.
Former congressman and lawyer Joe García believes that “the commitment that the Cuban-American elected leaders were supposed to have promised is false. What we have seen is silence from that leadership, or at most, cautious and beseeching criticism.
“I imagine all Cuban-American leaders are recalibrating what they are going to do, because they have been shaken. I don’t take away from them the fact that they have a lot of power, but the question is what they are going to do with it. Asking for more torture in Cuba is not a good strategy. It leads nowhere,” García believes.
“So far, they’ve had a shameful reaction, as they’ve continued to support the president despite the fact that he has taken measures against positions they have consistently defended,” comments former Cuban diplomat and political analyst Carlos Alzugaray, for whom Cuban-American leaders “have renounced positions they defended in the past to unabashedly embrace the MAGA or Trumpist canon.”
For Ric Herrero, executive director of the Cuba Study Group, “Cuban-American congressmen in South Florida find themselves between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the public outcry over Trump’s measures against I-220A, Biden’s parole beneficiaries, and democracy promotion programs is causing considerable unrest in their offices. On the other hand, congressmen seek to appear to be ‘working with’ and influencing the White House without publicly opposing Trump, who remains more popular among Florida’s Republican base than they are. It’s a difficult balancing act.”
Bilateral damage
According to OnCuba, sources who requested anonymity have learned that President Trump’s inner circle — including advisors such as Stephen Miller and Elon Musk himself — isn’t very interested in even the opinions of long-serving officials at the State Department when it comes to shaping the rest of his projection toward Cuba. And moderate voices that advocate for a path of normalization of relations with the island have been sidelined.
The administration appears unfazed when making unexpected and disruptive decisions. And as in other areas of its foreign policy, in this case it could be preparing to close even the smallest gap that could offer relief to Cubans.
But it’s very likely that the impacts of these measures will be felt on both sides.
Following the recent migration waves, and especially since the Obama and Biden administrations, the ties created between the island and Cuban-born citizens in the United States have intensified significantly in several respects and are much more dynamic than the always conflictive and meager relations between the two governments.
“Biblical proportions”
In statements to Fox News in early February, Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the Havana government as a “regime hostile to the United States,” “a disaster that has destroyed the country,” and rejected the possibility of traveling to Havana, “except to discuss when the current rulers will leave.” This speech practically positions Cuba as a national security issue.
“What you will be facing is of biblical proportions,” asserted Carlos Giménez, addressing President Díaz-Canel directly, through a message on X, implying that there is a well-detailed plan for Cuba.
“There are so many sanctions already against Cuba that little remains to be done, and what remains could affect Cuban residents or citizens of the United States who make up the government’s support base,” Alzugaray believes.
Measures that were used during Trump’s previous term could be on the table right now, such as a ban on commercial flights by U.S. airlines except for Havana and restrictions on people-to-people exchange travel for U.S. citizens.
“This would be drastic and would seriously affect family ties, citizen diplomacy, religious exchanges, and support for the private sector in Cuba,” says analyst Lee Schlenker, a master’s student in Latin American Studies at Georgetown University and a researcher at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Government.
“The cancellation of flights to Cuban provinces outside of Havana, as was the case in 2019, impacts a vital economic source for small and medium-sized Cuban cities that have fewer private businesses and receive fewer tourists than Havana,” Schlenker believes.
“The practice of U.S. sanctions has evolved significantly since the embargo was imposed in 1962 or codified into law in the 1990s,” Herrero explains. “Now Washington’s focus is on getting the global private sector — particularly banks and corporations — to comply with the sanctions because the U.S. government controls much of the financial system in which they operate. So we can expect the new administration to be ‘creative’ (as they’ve put it) in how they identify and squeeze those choke points.”
(Further) restricting foreign currency
Cuba’s foreign currency deficit, due to the decline in tourism following the COVID-19 pandemic, the decrease in remittances and exports, including medical services, is a critical factor that has worsened the shortages on the island.
The roadmap to try to stifle the Cuban government includes, as one of its first points, further restricting access to foreign currency by all means and as much as possible.
This has compounded the difficulties in supplying both food — the island imports more than 80% of what it consumes — and medicines, medical supplies, and fuel.
Cubans have suffered from terrible daily blackouts for almost a year, partly due to the extreme deterioration of the electricity generation and distribution infrastructure, as well as the lack of fuel.
Oil-laden ships frequently anchor without being able to deliver their cargo, waiting for weeks for payments that are delayed due to a lack of funds.
The long blacklist
In the first two weeks of his administration, the State Department reinstated the Cuba Restricted List.
Its objective is to prohibit “certain transactions with companies under the control of, or acting on behalf of or representing, the Cuban armed forces, intelligence services, or security services.” The list includes state-owned companies, hotels, stores, restaurants, among others.
In the new update, Orbit, S.A., a Cuban state-owned company in charge of managing remittances sent through Western Union on the island, was added.
Neither Orbit nor Western Union
Between November 2020 and March 2023, remittance transfers to Cuba via this channel were frozen, following the inclusion of Fincimex S.A. on the same list.
A few weeks ago, Western Union again suspended its money transfer services to Cuba “due to a change in U.S. sanctions regulations,” as the company explained in a statement.
Without Western Union in the mix, transfers will once again rely more on informal networks, the so-called “mules,” and remittances originating primarily from the United States will once again reach a minimum.
Since Western Union is not bank-connected, there are no official figures on the total amount of remittances to Cuba. While some studies estimate they could reach as much as $4 billion, the Cuban government reported that they fell below $1 billion in 2023.
Remittances were for years the country’s second or third largest source of foreign currency income, and it is estimated that around 70% of the population receives some amount annually.
“Forced labor”
Another way to strangle Cuba’s access to foreign currency is by undermining its exports, including those of medical services.
Near the end of February, the secretary of state announced the expansion of visa restrictions for “current or former Cuban government officials and other individuals, including foreign government officials” and their families, who are considered “responsible for or involved in the Cuban labor export program, particularly Cuban medical missions abroad.”
The argument is that authorities, both Cuban and those in the beneficiary countries, are complicit in the “forced labor” of professionals, especially healthcare professionals. The statement refers to “the regime’s abusive and coercive labor practices.”
The export of medical services has alternated with tourism for about twenty years as one of the main sources of income for the Cuban economy. Currently, some 24,000 Cuban doctors serve in nearly 60 countries.
The measure issued by the State Department seeks to inhibit those countries’ interest in maintaining or expanding these types of intergovernmental agreements, in which the Cuban side receives the bulk of the financial revenue and the doctors receive salaries.
Frictions with Caricom
“I will prefer to lose my U.S. visa than to have 60 poor and working people die,” said Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves referring to the dialysis treatments that Cuban doctors provide to patients in his country.
Cuban doctors provide essential and sometimes nonexistent healthcare in those countries, in isolated communities lacking basic services.
Several leaders of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries reacted en masse to this U.S. decision. Barbados Prime Minister Mia Mottley, current CARICOM chairwoman, said she was prepared to lose her U.S. visa if “a sensible agreement” on this issue is not reached with Washington, as “principles matter.”
Among Cubans: families, friends
Although a significant drop in remittances is expected from now on, given the difficulties in sending money following the sanctions imposed on Orbit S.A. and the suspension of services by Western Union, Cubans’ willingness to provide assistance to family and friends on the island remains unabated.
Far from it, the ways of sending remittances have taken unexpected turns in recent years; either by paying for the migration journeys of hundreds of thousands of relatives to the United States or other countries, or by investing in real estate — in a declining market — to do business or to improve the lives of family members left behind on the island. Many Cubans living abroad have provided start-up capital for the creation of private MSMEs run by relatives or friends.
Another indirect form of remittance that has helped cope with the crisis is shopping for Cuba on the dozens of online shopping platforms, among the best-known being Supermarket 23, Katapulk, and TuAmbia, which deliver basic necessities to doorsteps throughout the country.
Cuban economist and OnCuba columnist Juan Triana estimates that more than 3,000 orders are placed on these platforms daily, and that around 80% of what is sold are products that the Cuban state no longer guarantees in the basic food basket (practically nonexistent) and is also unable to maintain a stable supply in the markets, either in national currency or in foreign currency: chicken, rice, wheat flour, sausages, pork, powdered milk, eggs.
Supplying their loved ones
Armando, a 35-year-old Havanan, has been shopping on one of these platforms for nearly five years, on a monthly basis. Between him and his cousin, both residents in Kentucky, they provide food for four family members in Havana each month, all between the ages of 60 and 80. “We buy them meat, beans, eggs, and toiletries.…”
“Just imagine,” is his response to the question about how it would affect his family if this source of food and other basic goods were cut off. He asserts that his relatives in Cuba would have no alternative means, since they are older, unable to run around looking for what they need, and also financially dependent on him and his cousin. “They don’t do anything with the money.”
Paula lives in Portugal and has her 70-year-old mother in Cuba and four elderly aunts. She doesn’t have a large income, but she can send food irregularly depending on her family’s needs. Over the course of about three years, she has bought rice, beans, dairy products, and minced meat for her mother or aunts. When her mother turned 70, she bought a large combo of food and drinks for them to celebrate.
“When I heard that they might eliminate this option, my family was the first thing that came to mind. The impact would be significant. Not only because of the amount of food they would no longer be guaranteed thanks to the shipment, but because if we find ourselves without this supply, it will spread more hunger among many Cuban families. The shortages will worsen. And we’re talking about food and toiletries, which is what I send. Something very basic.”
Rumors and forecasts
Many of the online stores that ship to Cuba are operated by Cuban-American companies that have received special licenses in recent years from federal entities such as OFAC or the Department of Commerce to export to the island.
In most cases, in Cuba the conciliation, storage, and distribution processes are completed through the activities of private MSMEs. The Cuban government, which has no involvement in the chain, is only paid the corresponding taxes.
However, rumors are growing that the Trump administration would cancel these export licenses, thus destroying the entire trade network that allows purchases from “outside” to those “inside.” But not only that.
It would also significantly cripple supplies for small food production industries, hospitality businesses, and the neighborhood private grocery stores that have multiplied, run by MSMEs, where sales are made in Cuban pesos and where people pay for a large part of their daily supplies.
Ric Herrero predicts that “the measures will extend beyond restricting travel and visas to hinder trade with Cuba, regardless of whether it is with the Cuban state or the private sector. This week’s announcement that the U.S. Coast Guard will impose restrictions on vessels coming from Cuba is just one example. Of course, these vessels primarily transport food and household staples, most of which are currently sold by the island’s private sector. And those most affected by travel restrictions to and from Cuba are always Cuban families. So, once again, ordinary Cubans will be the ones bearing the brunt of these ‘pressure-cooker’ sanctions.”
Frozen chicken
One of the most in-demand products on these online commerce platforms and in the stores operated by MSMEs across all Cuban towns is frozen chicken, which has become the most consumed animal protein on the island, in the absence of others, and not because it’s cheap.
Due to high prices and the devaluation of the Cuban peso, families who only receive income from state salaries or pensions also cannot afford to buy chicken frequently. Forty percent of Cuban retirees receive minimum pensions of around 1,528 pesos, and 10 pounds of chicken currently costs between 3,000 and 3,500 pesos.
While social gaps in Cuba are widening, demand increased in 2024, reaching a new record in chicken meat exports from the United States to Cuba, exceeding $313 million annually.
In the last four years, according to Cuban economist Pedro Monreal, based on data from the Department of Agriculture, the purchase of chicken meat in the United States by various authorized Cuban economic actors — state entities, cooperatives, and MSMEs — amounted to $1.18 billion.
The Cuban government can make these purchases under the Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which authorizes the export of agricultural products to Cuba, provided that payments are made in cash, upfront, and without U.S. financing.
According to a report by the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, the island ranks 44th in the U.S. agricultural and food export market out of 203 locations.
The United States is one of the island’s main trading partners in terms of imports. Economically, the cancellation of this trade would constitute complete senselessness and would also directly affect U.S. producers and marketers.
And the private sector?
Trump had just finished his first term when the Cuban government allowed the creation of small private businesses in Cuba in 2021, which now total more than 9,000 registered businesses.
Cuba’s non-state sector, which includes self-employed workers and cooperatives, currently accounts for 35% of the active workforce and creates around 15% of GDP. A relevant fact is that it is responsible for 44% of retail sales in the country.
From Havana, Oniel Díaz, general manager of AUGE, a private corporate services company, confirms that they are preparing for bad news.
“We have analyzed the possible sanctions that the Trump administration could adopt if it decided to follow the approach of a portion of the Cuban-American community in Miami, especially Cuban-American congresspeople who, as is well known, defend the false theory that the private sector is a fraud and nothing more than a public relations operation of the Cuban government.”
“If this were to become the official discourse of the U.S. government regarding the private sector, they could even include some MSMEs they consider on the Cuba Restricted List,” explains Díaz.
“Something that would directly affect the private sector, in addition to the possible abolition of export licenses, would be a travel ban for Americans to Cuba, who continue to be a significant amount of guests for accommodation, transportation, catering, and gastronomy services offered by the private sector.”
For her part, Marta Deus, co-founder and CEO of the delivery company Mandao, believes that by removing all commercial licenses, the U.S. government “would only isolate Cuba once again, and we have seen for a long time that this is not a solution to what they are theoretically seeking. More isolation, more sanctions, more complications, higher prices.… In the end, it is always the people who end up being affected.”
“There are many people in Florida who have businesses associated with Cuba. We know of MSMEs here whose owners live in Miami; many who have agencies there, shipping to Cuba; in other words, their businesses thrive thanks to the existence of Cuba and people living here. We understand that it’s a large community, but with so much social pressure surrounding them, they don’t raise their voices much either. They are there, they benefit from these trade opportunities with Cuba, but when it comes to speaking out to save Cuba, they don’t say anything either,” Deus concludes.
Maximum pressure, but for what?
The multidimensional crisis Cuba is experiencing presents itself as the momentum to forcefully put pressure. By intensifying the daily precariousness that extends to all social sectors and throughout Cuba they seek to achieve a popular uprising — greater than that of July 11, 2021, which left almost 300 prisoners and disproportionate sentences.
Every day, many on both sides of the Strait hope for another outbreak, and that, it seems, is also the big bet from the “hardliners” in Washington. But to what end?
Would an administration that seeks to annex Canada and buy Greenland, that changes the name of the Gulf of Mexico, that announces the reconstruction of Gaza in resort style, subject to the expulsion of the Gazans, be content with a change of leadership in Cuba, or with the legalization of political parties and the holding of elections?
What do we Cubans want?
Former Congressman Joe García asks what we Cubans on both sides want: “We’ve been hearing for more than 60 years that the regime is on the brink of collapse, and people living in Cuba know that’s not the case; that the government is a disaster, but it’s not on the brink of collapse. They have power, they hold it, and since they’re dedicated to one thing — resisting — they will resist. But the question is, is that what the people of Cuba want? Both those inside and those outside?”
It’s worth asking whether counterweights can exist, whether moderate positions will achieve anything in a context marked by political extremism.
Oniel Díaz believes that, deep down, “Cubans love their families, they love their homeland, they love their soil, and that, ultimately, extreme measures that would lead us to a position of no return, of serious economic, political, and social deterioration, will not be applauded by the majority.”
With a less optimistic outlook, Guillermo Grenier, professor of sociology and principal investigator of the Cuba Poll — a survey designed to measure the political views of Cubans in South Florida — believes that “the moderate sector has no chance. Moderates can only function when there is at least a small opening.
“There are still companies in Miami that do business with MSMEs; but you’ll see that they, too, are backing down. I don’t see anyone lobbying for engagement with Cuba. There’s a lot of fear in Miami,” Grenier concludes.
“Nobody knows what’s going to happen, and they’re waiting for the worst. Congress members are Republicans first and Latinos/Hispanics/Cubans second. Until the courts or other governments pull their weight, Cuban congress members aren’t going to risk going against Trump,” he concludes.
Ric Herrero believes that “the main challenge facing moderates who favor better relations with Cuba is that they currently lack influence. Trump doesn’t need them, so his political team isn’t interested in hearing their perspectives.”
On the other hand, Herrero adds, “the Cuban government may not be a threat to the United States, but it does nothing to present Cuba as an opportunity for Americans. Without positive advances within the island to highlight, moderates are limited to helping individual Cubans, drawing attention to the humanitarian crisis, and continuing to advocate for an uncertain return to common-sense policies that can pull Cuba back from the abyss.”
