The name “new cold war,” used to describe the current state of relations between the United States and China, has supporters and detractors. Regardless of the final result of this discussion, its use is increasingly frequent by practitioners and specialists in international relations. It is related to the notable sharpening of tensions between the main powers of the international system during the most recent historical period, the beginning of which could conventionally be placed at the launch of the “Asian pivot” of the Obama administration and which has only intensified since then.
On this central axis of contemporary international politics, in just over a year a series of events and processes have taken place that have shaken and made enormously complex the global geopolitical stage, in general, and Sino-American relations, in particular.
These include the war in Ukraine, the visible strengthening of cooperation between China and Russia, the expansion of NATO, the role of India — now in its new status as the most populous country on the planet —, the “return” of Brazil, the reactivation of the BRICS group and its possible expansion, the worsening of international economic disruptions and the efforts of some countries to “de-dollarize” their commercial transactions.
Within this international situation, the countries of the so-called Global South — including Cuba — make up an extraordinarily heterogeneous conglomerate in terms of their respective capacities, positions, and foreign policy strategies to achieve their national objectives.
Furthermore, beyond their own will, these nations often represent contested territories as part of the exacerbation of rivalry between the major powers. In this context, it would seem opportune to reflect on the main alternative paths that Cuban foreign policy could follow, at a time when our country is going through a situation of deep and multidimensional crisis.
We are facing an international reality that would seem to increasingly be threatening and challenging, but that could also present usable opportunities based on an urgent process of national recovery and renewal.
Such foreign policy options could be outlined by means of three scenarios that describe extreme situations, projected towards a time horizon up to 2030:
- Alignment with the United States: It would be the most probable scenario in the event of the collapse of the current Cuban political system, although it would not be completely ruled out with a nominally revolutionary government in which the decisive influence of the historical leadership of the process started in 1959 no longer existed. Essentially, it would consist of the acceptance of U.S. domination over Cuba, which would be expressed in the adoption of a subaltern foreign policy and the absorption of the Cuban economy as a new component of the U.S. integration process, with a markedly excluding character with respect to other extra-regional economic powers, in particular China and Russia.
- Alignment with China and Russia: The current commercial, technical cooperation and reciprocal diplomatic support relations between Cuba and these two great powers would intensify rapidly. China would significantly increase its participation in foreign trade and foreign direct investment in Cuba. Cooperation with Russia would also be strengthened, including in the military field, although without crossing the “red lines” defined by the United States. In general, although Cuba’s relations with China and Russia would become significantly closer, in neither case would they reach a level equivalent to that which existed between Cuba and the Soviet Union during the period between the 1960s and the 1980s. Although China and Russia would continue to consider Cuba as an important political partner in Latin America and the Caribbean, neither of these two great powers would define our country as a vital ally for which, in the event of an extreme situation, they would be willing to assume the risk of a direct military confrontation with the United States.
- Active non-alignment: Cuba would develop a foreign policy with global projection, aimed at achieving a high degree of diversification in economic and political terms. It would confer a markedly non-ideologized character to its foreign relations. It would reorient its actions and public definitions in order to reach a position as equidistant as possible from the axis of conflict between the main powers, trying to keep Cuba as a disputed territory, but in such a way that none of them can exercise excessive influence and at the same time are encouraged to offer respectful treatment to our country. It would identify key partners in each geographic region in order to optimize the scarce resources of its foreign service and sustain its recognized professional effectiveness. It would reestablish diplomatic relations with South Korea and Israel. It would implement a decidedly aggressive policy to attract foreign direct investment and, based on it, it would give economic diplomacy an absolute priority. It would also give the highest priority to developing a coherent and comprehensive strategy to positively influence U.S. society and political system, with the goal of incentivizing a lasting reinstatement of the policy adopted on December 17, 2014, by the Obama administration, subsequently systematized in the Presidential Policy Directive of October 14, 2016.
The above descriptions only attempt to outline in a rudimentary way the main alternatives available to the Cuban authorities in terms of foreign policy, offering some brushstrokes to stimulate prospective imagination and the elaboration of more sophisticated scenarios.
In each case, these are extreme and logically consistent situations. In real life, it is most probable that Cuban foreign policy moves along intermediate paths — much more nuanced and not free of contradictions — between some of the three scenarios presented.
In fact, it could be affirmed that current politics maintains a trajectory located between the second and the third scenario, although in recent years it seems to be more inclined towards the second, perhaps not necessarily based on the will and preferences of the Cuban leadership, but rather due to external conditions, urgent economic needs and the lack of alternatives.
At this point, it is necessary to recognize that the Cuban authorities currently have very little room for maneuver to conduct their foreign policy, as a result of the intensification of the U.S. blockade and regime change policy, whose capacity to cause economic and social damage to the population increased exponentially and especially perversely. It has been the consequence of the combination of the very negative effects derived from the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, as well as the decrepitude of the Cuban economic model.
Objectively, U.S. policy pushes Cuba into the arms of China and Russia. Cuba could only move decisively towards a policy of active non-alignment if the United States resumed a policy essentially similar to the one adopted by the Obama administration during the final years of his second term.
The Cuban government would show a lack of intelligence and judgment if it distanced itself from China and Russia while the United States maintains its current policy towards our country. In other words, the probability of occurrence of the second scenario is directly proportional to the degree of hostility of U.S. policy, as this constitutes the independent variable that exerts the greatest influence on Cuban performance in the international arena.
On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that there are issues and processes of great relevance for the present and future development and well-being of Cuban society and that they could be common and desirable in any imaginable scenario. Such would be the case, for example, of the full normalization of relations with its emigrated population.
One final explanatory note: The building exercises scenario in the discipline of International Relations is not primarily intended to forecast future events, although that might also be a legitimate aspiration in any analysis of international politics.
In this case, the intention is simply to promote a public debate on an issue in which the legitimate aspiration of the vast majority of Cubans to live in an economically prosperous, socially just and politically independent country is at stake.
From a personal perspective, I would prefer and recommend that Cuban foreign policy in the coming years seek to approach the third scenario, considering it the most convenient option to serve national interests, avoiding as much as possible the enormous dangers that the world that is coming (and that we almost have here) and take advantage of any opportunity that helps our country get out of the quagmire in which it currently finds itself. In short, a foreign policy in transition is required for a world in transition.
IN 2016 Obama bent over backwards to start the ball rolling with Cuba , Biden vice President Cuba made Zero consesions . Now Biden , if you want a future ,the ball is in your court as we say , you have to give a little to get a little ….Bert
If Cuba aligns with the US it will be literally consumed by private interests. See Naomi Klein’s book The Shock Doctrine.